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In the current political climate, we can expect broad-based at-
tacks on the antidiscrimination laws to enjoy a warm reception in
many influential quarters. It is therefore worth trying to be clear
about what we think of arguments like that made by my colleague
Richard Epstein.' In this response I will discuss what seem to me
the central points in Professor Epstein's article.
In Part I, I will address the suggestion that the discrimination
laws-and the notion that male-female differences are a matter of
"gender" or "social construction"-are fatally flawed because many
differences between women and men are "biological" or "genetic"
rather than "social." In Part 11, 1 discuss Professor Epstein's more
general and implicit premise that gender discrimination laws are
necessarily unjustified because there are relevant differences be-
tween men and women. Part III is the conclusion.
I. THE GENETIC OR ENVIRONMENTAL ORIGIN OF GENDER
DIFFERENCES
Much of Professor Epstein's article is devoted to speculations in
sociobiology and neurophysiology. He seems to have two reasons for
this. One is that he believes, apparently, that the principal defense
of the gender discrimination laws, and more generally the defense of
the notion that differences in gender roles are "socially con-
structed," rests on the premise that there are no significant biologi-
cal differences between men and women. The other is that he appar-
ently believes that if he can establish that differences in labor
market performance between men and women are genetically or bi-
ologically based, instead of socially based, then he has shown that
* Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. My thanks to Mary Becker and Cass Sunstein
for their comments on an earlier draft.
1. Richard A. Epstein, Gender Is for Nouns, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 981 (1992).
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the antidiscrimination project will be prohibitively costly. The first
of these reasons is outdated; the second rests on a non sequitur. I
will address them in reverse order.2
A. Biological and Social Influences and the Costs of Change
I want to address this point first because Professor Epstein's view
rests on a mistaken premise that is widely held, and not just by
opponents of antidiscrimination laws. It is worth trying to get this
error cleared up before we proceed any further. The premise is, in
Professor Epstein's words: "If features of human behavior are re-
garded as biological, then the cost of change becomes higher ....
If, however, these differences are socially constructed, then they
could be socially reconstructed as well, at a lower cost. This lower
cost is one that society itself can bear."' Professor Epstein does not
try to justify this statement, and in fact it cannot be justified. There
is no reason whatever to believe that it is true. I know of no evidence
that there is a systematic relationship between the costs of changing
or overcoming a characteristic and its genetic or social origin. Many
genetic characteristics are easily modified or overcome, in the sense
that their effects are reduced or eliminated. Many characteristics
that are the product of the environment are impossible to overcome.4
2. I do not address Professor Epstein's claims about sociobiology and neurophysiology, other
than to note that the sociobiological models he relies upon, at least, have been tellingly criticized.
See PHILIP KITCHER. VAULTING AMBITION 166-76 (1985).
3. Epstein, supra note I, at 994. I take it the words "regarded as" should be omitted. The claim
is that costs are a function of the actual origin of the characteristics, not the perceived origin. The
claim about perceived origin would also be interesting, but I am certain it is not what Professor
Epstein intends, since it impugns his position. It suggests the side that can claim to be acting in
accordance with the dictates of biology gains an unjustifiable rhetorical advantage. I think that is
true, and it explains Professor Epstein's rhetorical strategy, but it is obviously not what he is
saying here.
As I discuss below (see infra Part I.B), Professor Epstein's use of the term "socially con-
structed" to mean something like "environmental in origin" rests on a misunderstanding; but for
purposes of the present discussion, I accept that use of the term.
4. It is worth trying to define "genetic" and "environmental" with some care. In a sense, no
human attribute is caused solely by the environment. All "environmental" characteristics are the
result of an interaction of environmental and genetic influences. That is because all environmental
influences on humans act on beings with a certain genetic endowment. (In fact, that seems to be
true by definition.)
Consider the clearest examples of characteristics that we would want to say are the result of the
environment-perhaps the paper cut I just inflicted on my finger. It is only because of my genetic
endowments that the paper cut my finger; if my genes caused me to grow armadillo skin there, I
would be fine. And if my genes caused my cells to grow back instantly, I would be fine.
Of course, one could define a characteristic as "genetic" whenever a different genetic makeup
(coupled with the same environmental influences) would have produced a different characteristic.
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Consider a few common human conditions. Nearsightedness is
unquestionably genetic in origin. But it can be overcome with a
cheap pair of glasses. Many serious diseases and injuries, on the
other hand, have environmental causes,5 but often no expenditure of
resources can overcome their effects. Every day we cheaply over-
come many of our genetic tendencies, when we get haircuts, wear
warm clothes, or exercise. And every day we find we must live with
environmentally induced traits, from injuries to ignorance, because
the cost of overcoming them is prohibitive or even infinite. There is
simply no obvious correlation between the genetic or environmental
origin of a characteristic and the ease of changing it or overcoming
it.
Let us assume that there are systematic differences in the relevant
desires and behavior of women and men, even along the lines that
Professor Epstein describes. Suppose we learn that women are more
risk averse and do prefer cooperative to confrontational jobs. We
now must decide what to do about that. Do we accept it as a given?
Or do we try to overcome it? If the latter, to what extent, and at
what cost?
Those are important questions, if the factual assumption is cor-
rect. But learning whether the origin of the difference is genetic,
even assuming we could learn that, does not help us at all. Suppose
it is: All the important questions remain, and learning that it is a
genetic characteristic does not help us solve them. Is it a character-
istic we want to live with, or one we want to overcome at least in
part? Learning whether it is genetic or environmental does not help
with that. If we want to overcome it, what is the cost?6 That will
That is not necessarily an objectionable definition. But what it means is that the category of
"environmental" characteristics is empty, and the nature-nurture debate would be even more obvi-
ously pointless.
5. Environmental causes, in turn, may or may not be related to human behavior. But again,
there is no systematic relationship between the source of the environmental cause and the ease of
preventing it or overcoming it. In particular, environmental causes with their roots in human be-
havior are not more easily controlled than causes attributable solely to nature. Both the un-
mediated rays of the sun and a nuclear power program in a foreign country can harm me; it is
much easier to put on sunscreen and avert the danger from the former than to influence the
human behavior that makes the latter dangerous.
6. We might try to overcome the differences either by trying to modify the behavior or by
requiring that the differences be ignored. Roughly speaking, the antidiscrimination project calls
for the latter, in the first instance. That has costs of the kind Professor Epstein identifies. (It may
also have countervailing benefits, but that is not my point at the moment.) The question is
whether those costs are worth it, a question that is not answered simply by asserting the existence
of the differences.
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not vary systematically with whether the difference is genetic or en-
vironmental. Some genetic characteristics will be impossible to over-
come; the same is true of some environmental characteristics. If the
cost is finite, is it worth it? There again the nature-nurture issue is
irrelevant.
The reason people engage in the nature-nurture debate, I believe,
has nothing to do with the costs of changing or overcoming attrib-
utes. Rather it is a debate that reflects attitudes. The view that "it's
genetic" goes hand in hand with an attitude that we cannot fight the
status quo. The connection is fallacious, as I have said. We fight the
genetic status quo daily, sometimes at low cost and sometimes at
high cost. The view that "it's society" goes hand in hand with the
idea that we can change it. That, too, is fallacious. There are many
intractable conditions that are caused by the environment. The real
issue is one of attitudes toward certain kinds of programs. That is-
sue should be resolved by a careful and comprehensive weighing of
the advantages and disadvantages of various proposals, not by trying
to enlist biology on one's side.
B. Feminism and "Real Differences"
The second problem with Professor Epstein's account is this: Not
only does the nature-nurture issue have nothing to do with the costs
of the antidiscrimination project; it has nothing to do with the ques-
tion of "sex" versus "gender" that preoccupies Professor Epstein.
Professor Epstein assumes that there: is an opposition between the
"biological" and the "socially constructed," so that something that
is genetic or biological in origin cannot be "socially constructed,"
and vice versa.' Therefore, if he can demonstrate that there are ge-
netic differences between men and women, he can (he apparently
believes) put to rest the idea that these differences are "socially
constructed."
This view rests on a misunderstanding of the term "socially con-
structed." To some extent the misunderstanding is not Professor Ep-
stein's fault. I am not a fan of the widespread use of the term "so-
7. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 1, at 982 ("[T]he term gender carries with it the implication
that we are exploring the relationship between males and females as a social phenomenon, and not
as a biological one."); id. at 987 ("[My] analysis.. .s utterly inconsistent with the program that
seeks to make social influences dominant to the exclusion of biological ones."); id. at 987-88
("One set of differences clearly has to do with the structure and function of the brain, where the
evidence of sex differences in structure and function seems to multiply, notwithstanding the drum-
beat that insists that all relevant sex differences are socially constructed." (footnote omitted)).
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cially, constructed." I think it is vague and usually unhelpful; the
idea that most of its users want to convey can be stated more di-
rectly and less confusingly.
The term "socially constructed," as I understand it, means not
that the characteristics in question are literally created by society
but that the decision what to do about them is one that society can
make. To say that the difference between men and women is socially
constructed (and therefore should be labelled "gender" not "sex") is
not to deny that there are biological differences (really, now, who
denies that?). Rather, it is to assert that the social significance of
those differences is something that is ultimately subject to collective
decision.8
So, for example, there are real biological differences between
physically strong people and physically weak people. But society has
constructed various notions in a way that sometimes value physical
-strength, sometimes regard it as irrelevant, and sometimes regard it
unfavorably. (A physically strong male is, in some settings, more
threatening and therefore less valued than a physically weak male; a
physically strong female is sometimes considered less attractive and
therefore less valued.) This is the sense in which the differences be-
tween women and men are socially constructed. Professor Epstein's
biological excursions are therefore again essentially irrelevant.9
As I said, I do not think Professor Epstein should be blamed en-
tirely for this misunderstanding; much of the problem lies in the
loose use of the term "socially constructed." But Professor Epstein
8. As I discuss in the text below, Professor Epstein recognizes this notion, although he does not
associate it with the term "socially constructed" when he says: "The judgment of whether certain
acts are, or should be, allowable is in the end always social, no matter what one's view of human
nature." Id. at 994.
9. There is another possible sense of the term "socially constructed" that makes biology more
relevant, although still secondary. One reason to question certain attitudes or characteristics is
that they have their origin in unjust circumstances. So, for example, it might be argued that
although there are genuine differences in the abilities of two groups, the differences are the result
of past discrimination, and therefore those differences should not be allowed to influence the
groups' respective opportunities. Or it might be argued that attitudes that have developed in re-
sponse to deprivation or injustice-a freed slave's expressed desire to remain in slavery, or freed
hostages' expressions of solidarity with their former captors-should not be regarded as genuine.
These arguments, which rest on relatively complex moral or psychological premises, would be
answered by showing that the characteristics in question have an exclusively biological (or un-
tainted environmental) origin. But Professor Epstein does not claim to make such a showing, and
no such claim would be plausible. The most he asserts is that there are biological tendencies. That
is compatible with the position that society has heightened those tendencies in illegitimate ways.
Indeed to some degree it reinforces that position, as some feminists have argued. See, e.g., ALISON
M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE 106-13 (1983).
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should be blamed for ignoring, or being unaware of, a substantial
literature that would have tipped him off. One of the most conspicu-
ous developments in feminist literature in the last decade is the ar-
gument, made by many feminists, that there are "real differences"
between women and men that are the product either of biology or of
similar, deeply rooted factors. Some of this literature, such as Carol
Gilligan's In a Different Voice,10 has made it into semi-popular cul-
ture. Other work, like Nancy Chodorow's The Reproduction of
Mothering," is almost as well known. There is an important radical
feminist literature that insists on the biological origin of differences
between men and women. 2 And in any event this development has
been a conspicuous feature of the legal literature.'
This is not a unanimous view; many proponents of antidiscrimina-
tion laws argue that it is at least tactically unwise to emphasize the
differences between men and women.' 4 (Professor Epstein's paper is
evidence in support of that view, at least.) But the notion that gen-
der is a social construct is common ground among a wide range of
feminists, including many who believe in biological or otherwise
deep-seated differences. 5 Of course, the fact that a position is com-
mon ground among feminists does not make it right. Perhaps the
notion of social construction is, as I suggested earlier, unhelpful.
Perhaps the existence of deep-seated differences between women
and men makes it false to say that gender is a social category. (Even
then, the important point would be how resistant the differences
10. CAROL GILLIGAN. IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVEL-
OPMENT (1978).
11. NANCY CHODOROW. THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SO-
CIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978).
12. See, e.g., MARY DALY, GYN/ECOLOGY: THE METAETHICS OF RADICAL FEMINISM (1978);
SUSAN GRIFFIN, WOMAN AND NATURE: THE ROARING INSIDE HER (1978); JAGGAR. supra note 9;
ADRIENNE RICH. OF WOMAN BORN (1976).
13. A leading article is Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988);
see also id. at 14-28 (discussing, among others, MARILYN FRENCH, BEYOND POWER 482-83
(1985); NEL NODDINGS, CARING (1984); ADRIENNE RICH, ON LIES, SECRETS, AND SILENCE 260-
63 (1979)); sources cited in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 156-58 (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne
Kennedy eds., 1991).
14. Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, quoted by Richard Epstein, is in this category. See CYNTHIA FUCHS
EPSTEIN, DECEPTIVE DISTINCTIONS: SEX. GENDER, AND THE SOCIAL ORDER (1988) (cited in Ep-
stein, supra note I, at 983 n.5). Gilligan's prominent work, in particular, has been criticized by
many. See, e.g., Ellen C. DuBois et al., Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law-A
Conversation, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 11 (1985); Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L.,
REV. 797, 802-22 (1989).
15. See SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 6-7 (1989) (discussing the
social construction of gender).
1012 [Vol. 41:1007
1992] BIOLOGY, DIFFERENCE, AND DISCRIMINATION 1013
were to being changed or overcome, not their biological character.)
The problem with Professor Epstein's account, however, is that he
simply assumes the crucial premise in his own favor-that to the
extent there are biological differences, gender cannot be socially
constructed-and goes on to make his biological arguments. That
makes his argument on this issue, too, beside the point. The fact
that so many advocates of antidiscrimination measures have un-
coupled the nature-nurture question from the question of social con-
struction should have alerted him that he had this problem.
II. DISCRIMINATION AND RELEVANT DIFFERENCES
Professor Epstein also, of course, has views on what I say the real
question is: what society should do about gender. One of his views is
that it should not enact antidiscrimination laws. The part of his pa-
per where he defends this proposition directly (that is, other than by
arguing the irrelevant nature-nurture issue) is much less prominent
and explicit. But Professor Epstein seems to be making four argu-
ments, which I consider in turn.
A. There Is No Discrimination
First, Professor Epstein asserts that any differences in the jobs
that women and men hold are the result of differences in their char-
acteristics or preferences. "The disparate employment patterns so
commonplace today are consistent with the proposition of the pref-
erences of workers. They offer no evidence of discrimination, much
less invidious discrimination." 1 Professor Epstein cites no source for
this observation.
Well, of course, there is plenty of evidence. There is an abundant
literature suggesting that employment disparities between women
and men result from discrimination in various forms. Some of this
relies on aggregate studies of wages and salaries; 7 some systemati-
cally studies workplace conditions.' 8 Some suggest that employers
pay less to women, or afford them different employment opportuni-
16. Epstein, supra note 1, at 998.
17. See, e.g., Barry A. Gerhart & George T. Milkovich, Salaries, Salary Growth, and Promo-
tions of Men and Women in Large, Private Firms, in PAY EQUITY: EMPIRICAL INQUIRIES 23, 23-
43 (Robert T. Michael et al., eds., 1989).
18. See, e.g., ROSABETH Moss KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 250-67
(1977); CHRISTINE L. WILLIAMS. GENDER DIFFERENCES AT WORK: WOMEN AND MEN IN NON-
TRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS (1989) (studying men in nursing and women in the Marines).
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ties, because they themselves are discriminatory (or are responding
to discriminatory preferences by their customers or employees); 19
others suggest that discriminatory treatment of various kinds affects
women's attitudes and capacities in ways that employers then ra-
tionally take into account.20 Some of these studies may be mistaken.
Maybe even all are, although that seems unlikely. But simply to
assert that workplace disparities are not the result of discrimination
does not, to put it mildly, advance the debate.
B. The Antidiscrimination Laws Assume that All Differences in
Outcome Are the Result of Discrimination
Perhaps the reason Professor Epstein asserts the absence of dis-
crimination so casually is that he misunderstands what the propo-
nents of antidiscrimination laws are claiming. At one point he char-
acterizes their argument in this way: "Illicit discrimination is the
source of the difference in occupational patterns, for which there is
no alternative explanation."2 That idea-that the employment pat-
terns of women and men would be identical were it not for discrimi-
nation-really is implausible. So far as I am concerned, assertion
alone would be enough to dismiss that notion.
But I know of no one who believes this. (Professor Epstein cites
no one.) In any event, even if there is someone who believes this, the
important point is that the antidiscrimination laws do not in any
way rest on this premise. They do not remotely require identity of
outcome.
The disparate treatment standard only requires that employers
not sort employees on the basis of gender.22 If women's and men's
preferences and capacities differ systematically, the disparate treat-
ment standard permits those differences to be reflected in outcomes,
19. See, e.g., SARA M. EVANS & BARBARA J. NELSON, WAGE JUSTICE: COMPARABLE WORTH
AND THE PARADOX OF TECHNOCRATIC REFORM (1989); JERRY A. JACOBS, REVOLVING DOORS:
SEX SEGREGATION AND WOMEN'S CAREERS (1989); Randall K. Filer, Occupational Segregation,
Compensating Differentials, and Comparable Worth, in PAY EQUITY: EMPIRICAL INQUIRIES.
supra note 17, at 153, 155-56; Morley Gunderson, Male-Female Wage Differentials and Policy
Responses, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 46 (1989).
20. Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42
VAND. L. REV. 1183 (1989); Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial
Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of
Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990).
21. Epstein, supra note 1, at 997.
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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so long as gender was not in any way the basis of the employer's
actions. The disparate impact standard does impose some limits on
outcomes, but subject to a business necessity defense; that is, the
employer need not equalize outcomes if it would be too costly to do
SO. 23 So even under the disparate impact standard, differences that
would be too costly to ignore need not be ignored.
So the question remains: Are the antidiscrimination laws justi-
fied? Professor Epstein cannot rest his negative answer either on the
assertion that there is no discrimination, or on the proposition that
those laws require complete equalization of result and therefore are
not to be taken seriously.
C. The Antidiscrimination Laws Are Too Costly
Professor Epstein states this conclusion clearly enough, but his ar-
gument for it suffers from a number of problems: His normative
framework is never made explicit; he once again relies crucially on
assertion; and he ignores counterarguments.
I begin with the normative framework. It would be helpful to
know whether Professor Epstein is using some form of utilitarian
argument, or a social contract theory, or a rights-based libertarian
account, or just what he is using. It appears he is using none of
these but instead a criterion from welfare economics known as
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, or potential Pareto optimality.24
The evidence is that Professor Epstein simply assumes that the
problem is one of "social gains" and "costs" or "losses." For exam-
ple, the reason we forbid "murder, rape, [and] theft" is that "the
net social losses .. .far exceed the total gains."2 " He adds: "Where
differences in taste and temperaments lead to a specialization in
family and workplace roles by sex, the gains from trade stand in
sharp contrast to the losses attributable to the use of force."'26 So
the relevant "gains" and "losses" are of the kind produced by ex-
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). After
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), Congress explicitly adopted the dispa-
rate impact and business necessity standards announced in Griggs. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.
L. No. 102-166, § 105(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1988 &
Supp. III 1991)).
24. J.R. HICKS. VALUE AND CAPITAL: AN INQUIRY INTO SOME FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF
ECONOMIC THEORY (2d ed. 1946); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and In-
terpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939).
25. Epstein, supra note 1, at 994.
26. Id. at 995.
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changes. Similarly, in his final assertion about the harm that an-
tidiscrimination laws will do, Professor Epstein refers to "reductions
in output" that will be "substantial. 2 7
The well-known problem with the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is that it
is not plausible as a standard for evaluating the justice of social
institutions generally. The principal reason is that it ignores distri-
butional concerns. Also, it is at least arguable that the satisfaction
of certain desires (such as misogynist desires not to associate with
women) should not count in the social welfare function. 8 If Profes-
sor Epstein's condemnation of the antidiscrimination laws rests on
such a controversial (indeed, implausible) moral foundation-and it
evidently does-the foundation at least needs to be made explicit,
and the obvious objections to it acknowledged. One cannot simply
assume that any institution that causes "reductions in output" is
ipso facto unjustified.
The second problem is that Professor Epstein makes no effort to
give a systematic account of the costs of the antidiscrimination laws,
even within the Kaldor-Hicks framework. He just asserts that they
are "substantial," without any argument or justification. 9 There is
an argument in the literature, again unaddressed by Professor Ep-
stein, that laws forbidding gender discrimination will have a ten-
dency to increase social wealth.3 0
Finally, there are what might loosely be called distributional
gains: not necessarily a redistribution of income or wealth down-
ward, but gains in terms of women's self-respect, social status, and
freedom from dependency. It is impossible to deny that such gains
exist. A recurrent theme of American history-shaped by the expe-
rience with slavery-has been that people's status depends on their
ability to sell their labor in employment markets. 1 On a more con-
27. Id. at 1000.
28. The point that the Kaldor-Hicks standard is an implausible moral criterion is widely made.
See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN. ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 33 n.4 (1987). Even the leading proponent
of the use of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion as an ethical norm appears to acknowledge its implausi-
bility in a category of cases that would, I believe, include discrimination laws. See RICHARD A.
POSNER. THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 101 (1981) (acknowledging. that when a policy of wealth
maximization has a "substantial and nonrandom" distributional impact, then consent cannot be
imputed to those adversely affected, and moral support for the policy is undermined).
29. Epstein, supra note 1, at 1000.
30. See John J. Donohue III, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An Economic
Perspective. 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1337, 1348-55 (1989).
31. See, e.g., ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUB-
LICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (1970); JUDITH SHKLAR. AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE
QUEST FOR INCLUSION (1991).
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crete level, women are often in a vulnerable position, as a result of
mistreatment by men, that can be alleviated if they have indepen-
dent income or employment opportunities. 32 There are many other
possible justifications for the antidiscrimination regime as well. 33 In
any plausible moral theory, including any utilitarian theory, these
benefits of antidiscrimination laws, as well as their costs, must be
taken into account.
Whether these possible gains from the antidiscrimination laws are
worth it is another matter. That is a question that requires serious
case-by-case consideration, taking into account the costs on which
Professor Epstein concentrates. It is of course true that questions of
resource allocation "do[] not disappear by diverting the discussion
to fine-spun issues of caste or similar issues. ' '34 But issues of caste
do not disappear by focusing exclusively on resource allocation (or
by calling them fine-spun, or defining them solely in terms of formal
legal barriers). It is not enough to condemn the antidiscrimination
laws by announcing (perhaps correctly) that they impose certain
costs on society and then ignoring any case made in their defense.
That is the intellectual equivalent of condemning markets on the
ground that they are "alienating" and simply ignoring the benefits
they bring.
D. Statistical Discrimination and the Cost-Justification Defense
The fourth element of Professor Epstein's argument is more ex-
plicit. It is his claim that there should be a "cost-justification" de-
fense under the antidiscrimination laws. My principal objection to
this argument is the same I. have made before: It establishes that
the antidiscrimination laws, have certain costs, without engaging
those who think the costs are worth it. But Professor Epstein's argu-
ment on this particular point is actually quite helpful to the debate
over discrimination laws, although in a different way from what, I
32. It is not clear that Professor Epstein would acknowledge this. In his discussion of the dis-
parity in wage levels between men and women, he says that the disparity in measured market
wages "has to be corrected to take into account the higher imputed income of women resulting
from the greater value of their services around the home." Epstein, supra note 1, at 996. But this
is correct only if the arrangement whereby families allocate household labor is a fully voluntary
contract. To the extent there are elements of coercion, the income can no more be imputed to
women than it could be to domestic slaves. On the contrary; women's household labor would
represent wealth expropriated from them.
33. See, e.g., OKIN, supra note 15, at 134-69.
34. Epstein, supra note I, at 1002.
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suspect, he intended.
A dominant feature of the current debate in antidiscrimination
law is the sharp division between "nondiscrimination"-which virtu-
ally everyone seems to favor, at least in principle-and "affirmative
action" or (as its opponents call it) "reverse discrimination," which
some favor and some revile as just another form of discrimination.?3
Suitably generalized, Professor Epstein's cost justification argument
shows, correctly, that this distinction is illusory.
First, Professor Epstein's suggestion that there should be a cost-
justification defense is really a broader argument for what might be
called a statistical discrimination defense. Roughly speaking, statis-
tical discrimination is the use of a characteristic, like gender or
race, as a proxy for other characteristics that are related to an em-
ployee's productivity.36 It can be rational for an employer to engage
in statistical discrimination when it has imperfect information about
each employee's specific productivity-related characteristics and the
proxy (gender or race) is correlated to those characteristics. The
idea is that it is impossible, or too costly, to find out how productive
each employee will be, so it is worthwhile to use the crude but
roughly accurate (and cheaply ascertained) proxy characteristic.
Employers who have no animus toward a group can rationally en-
gage in statistical discrimination against that group.
I believe this is what Professor Epstein is describing in his ac-
count of how an employer might pay less to women because they are
more accident prone. 37 There is no reason to distinguish the cost of
being more accident prone from any other cost, including the "cost"
of simply being a less productive employee. So Professor Epstein's
argument would apply equally well if an employer discovered that,
for whatever reason, women on the whole were just "less good" em-
ployees. The "cost-justification defense" is really a statistical dis-
crimination defense.
Professor Epstein says, correctly, that the employment discrimina-
35. See, e.g., Robert Belton, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Future of Affirmative Ac-
tion: A Preliminary Assessment, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1085 (1992); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr.,
Diversity, Multiculturalism, and Affirmative Action: Duke, the NAS, and Apartheid, 41 DEPAUL
L. REV, 1141 (1992); Lino A. Graglia, Racial Preferences, Quotas, and the Civil Rights Act of
1991, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1117 (1992).
36. The principal early works on statistical discrimination are Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory
of Discrimination. in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS 3 (Orley Ashenfelter & Albert Rees
eds., 1973), and Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON.
REV. 659 (1972).
37. Epstein, supra note 1, at 1001-02.
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tion laws would not allow the employer to engage in statistical dis-
crimination, including the kind of cost-justified discrimination he
describes. He also says, correctly, that the laws realistically could
not allow a statistical discrimination defense without completely un-
ravelling in practice (and maybe in theory). And he concludes-in a
sense correctly-that the employment discrimination laws therefore
operate as an "in-kind subsidy that like all subsidies distorts em-
ployment decisions."38 That is, the antidiscrimination laws amount
to a form of affirmative action: They aid the protected group at the
expense of society as a whole.
I am going beyond Professor Epstein's explicit argument, which is
limited-arbitrarily, it seems to me-to one particular cost. But
something like this seems to be his point. And it seems to me to be
correct.39 If the antidiscrimination laws reach statistical discrimina-
tion, and for both practical and theoretical reasons they really must,
then there is no significant difference between nondiscrimination, on
the one hand, and "subsidies" to protected groups-that is, affirma-
tive action-on the other. The conclusion Professor Epstein draws is
that both nondiscrimination and affirmative action should go. The
conclusion I would draw is that both are good ideas, and equally so.
We will *not settle that issue here. But it is good to see Professor
Epstein agree (implicitly and in principle, anyway) that the single
most prominent and divisive element of the current political debate
about discrimination law-the supposedly sharp distinction between
nondiscrimination and affirmative action-should be put aside.
Professor Epstein's argument on this point does, however, have
the same defects as his other arguments. He identifies a cost of the
antidiscrimination regime and does not mention the possible bene-
fits. In this instance it is again not even clear that the antidis-
crimination regime has net costs in Kaldor-Hicks terms: There is a
well-known argument that statistical discrimination, although ra-
tional for an employer, is not efficient for society as a whole because
it produces nonoptimal levels of investment in human capital. 0 And
the various arguments I made earlier about the benefits of the an-
38. Id. at 1002.
39. See David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 SuP. CT. REv. 99.
40. See Shelly J. Lundberg & Richard Startz, Private Discrimination and Social Intervention
in Competitive Labor Markets, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 340 (1983); Donohue, supra note 30, at 1356-
58.
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tidiscrimination laws apply, at least to a degree, to statistical dis-
crimination as well.
III. CONCLUSION
The laws forbidding gender discrimination (and the race discrimi-
nation laws as well) raise important and difficult issues. In criticiz-
ing Professor Epstein I do not want to suggest that I think those
laws as they stand are optimal, or even close to optimal. 41 It is
worth thinking about those laws from the ground up. In the area of
gender discrimination, it is worth trying to identify exactly what we
are trying to accomplish-how, for example, the mission of the gen-
der discrimination laws differs from that of the race discrimination
laws. It is also worth considering the questions of cost on which Pro-
fessor Epstein places so much emphasis.
But this debate, like all debates, is advanced by engaging the
other side, by making one's own premises explicit, and by acknowl-
edging, to the extent possible, the ways in which one's own position
is vulnerable. An argument that does not do these things fails to
contribute to the debate in the way that it should. Such an argu-
ment risks becoming either undisciplined self-expression, compara-
ble to cheering and booing, or, worse, intellectually high-sounding
cover for people who want to advance a cause for their own reasons.
There is a time for cheering and booing, and perhaps there is a time
for intellectual cover. And these failings are not, I should empha-
size, a monopoly of one side of the discrimination debate. Professor
Epstein's argument should force proponents of the antidiscrimina-
tion laws to think through their own premises again. But his argu-
ment is too much the prisoner of its own undefended or implausible
premises, and too unmindful of the counterarguments, to pose a
genuine challenge to those who believe gender discrimination should
be unlawful.
41. 1 suggested a new approach to race discrimination laws in David A. Strauss, The Law and
Economics of Race Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEo.
L.J. 1619 (1991).
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